I am a Leverhulme Early Career Fellow in the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Oxford. I mostly work in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and legal theory.
Much of my research concerns the relationship between perception and thought. For instance, among the other things it allows us to do, perception enables us to think about the observable properties of objects (e.g. their colour, their shape, their size, etc.). In my dissertation I investigated what this fact should lead us to say about perception and thought. My more recent work explores the epistemic significance of perceptual structure.
I also write about other issues. I am particularly interested in debates about reference, quantification, perceptual illusion, perceptual attention, and the rational significance of perceptual experience.
Much of my research concerns the relationship between perception and thought. For instance, among the other things it allows us to do, perception enables us to think about the observable properties of objects (e.g. their colour, their shape, their size, etc.). In my dissertation I investigated what this fact should lead us to say about perception and thought. My more recent work explores the epistemic significance of perceptual structure.
I also write about other issues. I am particularly interested in debates about reference, quantification, perceptual illusion, perceptual attention, and the rational significance of perceptual experience.
