I am a Leverhulme Early Career Fellow in the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Oxford. I mostly work in philosophy of mind, epistemology, and legal theory.
Much of my research concerns the relationship between perception and thought. For instance, among the other things it allows us to do, perception enables us to think about the observable properties of objects (e.g. their colour, their shape, their size, etc.). One strand of my research investigates what this fact should lead us to say about perception and thought.
Another major strand explores the epistemic significance of perceptual structure. Structural features are relatively invariant aspects of perceptual experience, such as our awareness of the boundedness of the spatial sensory field.
I also write about nearby issues in philosophy of mind, epistemology, and philosophy of language. I am particularly interested in debates about reference, quantification, communication, perceptual illusion, perceptual attention, and the rational significance of perceptual experience.
My forays into legal theory began with the foundations of general jurisprudence, but now also encompass questions about the relationship between privacy and control.
Much of my research concerns the relationship between perception and thought. For instance, among the other things it allows us to do, perception enables us to think about the observable properties of objects (e.g. their colour, their shape, their size, etc.). One strand of my research investigates what this fact should lead us to say about perception and thought.
Another major strand explores the epistemic significance of perceptual structure. Structural features are relatively invariant aspects of perceptual experience, such as our awareness of the boundedness of the spatial sensory field.
I also write about nearby issues in philosophy of mind, epistemology, and philosophy of language. I am particularly interested in debates about reference, quantification, communication, perceptual illusion, perceptual attention, and the rational significance of perceptual experience.
My forays into legal theory began with the foundations of general jurisprudence, but now also encompass questions about the relationship between privacy and control.
