Abridged CV 

Employment
2018-2021:  Leverhulme Early Career Fellow, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford 
2016-2018:  Research Fellow, Department of Philosophy, King's College London

​Education
PhD in Philosophy  [2016] 
Supervisor: Imogen Dickie 
Thesis: Getting Properties in Mind 
University of Toronto 

Honours Bachelor of Arts (with High Distinction) [2009] 
Philosophy, English, and Mathematics
University of Toronto 

Articles 

1. Alford-Duguid, D. (2018) Thought about Properties: Why the Perceptual Case is Basic. Philosophical Quarterly 68 (271): 221-242. [Pen. Draft]
2. Alford-Duguid, D. & Arsenault, M. (2017) On the Explanatory Power of Hallucination. Synthese 194: 1765-1785. 

Awards and Grants 

• Early Career Researcher Award, John Fell Fund, 2019-2021
• Early Career Fellowship, Leverhulme Trust, 2018-2021
• David Savan Dissertation Prize, University of Toronto, 2017
• SSHRC Postdoctoral Fellowship, 2016-2018
• George Paxton Young Memorial Award in Philosophy, University of Toronto, 2015
• Doctoral Completion Grant, University of Toronto, 2014-2015
• SSHRC Michael Smith Foreign Study Supplement, 2012
• Ontario Graduate Scholarship, 2012-2013
• Martha Lile Love Essay Award, University of Toronto, 2010
• SSHRC Canada Graduate Scholarship (Doctoral Award), 2009-2012

Presentations 

1. ‘On the Epistemic Significance of Perceptual Structure’ APA - Pacific, Vancouver (April 2019)
2. ‘Perception-Based Thought About Properties Tolerates Perceptual Error’ Simon Fraser University (December 2018)
3. ‘On the Epistemic Significance of Perceptual Structure’ Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and Mind Association, U. of Oxford (July 2018)
4. ‘On the Epistemic Significance of Perceptual Structure’ Canadian Philosophical Association Annual Congress, Montreal (June 2018)
5. ‘Perception-Based Thought About Properties Tolerates Perceptual Error’ Canadian Philosophical Association Annual Congress, Montreal (June 2018)
6. ‘Perception-Based Thought About Properties Tolerates Perceptual Error’ Complutense University of Madrid (February 2018)
7. ‘Thinking Through Illusion’ University of Manitoba (February 2018)
8. ‘On the Epistemic Significance of Perceptual Structure’ University of Cambridge (January 2018)
9. ‘General Jurisprudence as Descriptive Metaphysics’ Workshop on Philosophy of Law and Metaethics, University of Surrey School of Law (Dec. 2017)
10. ‘On the Epistemic Significance of Perceptual Structure’ Cognitive Science Research Group, New College of the Humanities (November 2017)
11. ‘General Jurisprudence as Descriptive Metaphysics’ Legal Theory Seminar Series, University of Edinburgh Law School (October 2017)
12. ‘On the Epistemic Significance of Perceptual Structure’ London Workshop on Knowledge First Philosophy of Mind (June 2017)
13. ‘Thinking Through Illusion’ King's College London (November 2016)
14. ‘Thinking Through Illusion’ Society for Exact Philosophy (May 2016)
15. ‘Assertion and Gaps’ Semantics and Philosophy Colloquium, University of Cambridge (September 2015)
16. ‘Thinking Through Illusion’ PLM Conference, Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature, Oslo (September 2015)
17. ‘The Structure of Predicative Thought’ Society for Exact Philosophy (May 2015)
18. ‘Attention to Properties and Reference to Objects’ APA - Pacific, San Diego (April 2014)
19. ‘Attention to Properties and Reference to Objects’ MindGrad, University of Warwick (December 2013)
20. ‘Articulate Acquaintance: Russell and Nonsense’ Russell and Wittgenstein at the Crossroads 1911-1921, McMaster University (November 2013)
21. ‘Do Predicates Refer?’ Society for Exact Philosophy (May 2013)
22. ‘Varieties of Attention’ Pitt/CMU Graduate Philosophy Conference (April 2013)
23. ‘Varieties of Attention’ UT-Austin Graduate Philosophy Conference (April 2013)
24. ‘Russell vs. Wittgenstein on Nonsense’ APA - Pacific, San Francisco  (March 2013)
25. ‘Looking to Think About Properties’ Graduate Philosophy Conference, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (March 2013)