Publications
  1. (forthcoming) Russell on Propositions. Routledge Handbook of Propositions. C. Tillman and A. Murray (Eds.) [co-authored with Fatema Amijee]
  2. (2020) Thinking Through Illusion. European Journal of Philosophy. 
  3. (2018) Thought about Properties: Why the Perceptual Case is Basic. Philosophical Quarterly. [Penultimate Draft]
  4. (2017) On the Explanatory Power of Hallucination. Synthese. [co-authored with Mike Arsenault]  [Published Version]

Work in Progress 
On perceptual structure:
  1. A paper on the implications of perception's structural features for a right account of perceptual justification.
  2. A paper that motivates and develops a new framework for understanding the debate over whether we perceive other minds.
  3. A paper about how perception's structural features can inform perceivers about the world.
  4. A paper that develops and defends a new austere account of how sensory experience can provide knowledge of non-actual possibilities
On perception and thought:
  1. A paper devoted to defending the claim that perception can mislead us about what a property is like, and yet still permit us to form perceptual demonstrative thoughts about the property. [This is a companion piece to my 'Thinking Through Illusion' (EJP, 2020).]
  2. A paper that diagnoses, and then undermines, the widespread presumption that hallucinatory experiences put us in perceptual contact with colours, shapes, and sizes.  
  3. A paper about whether sortalism is true for thought about properties, and what its truth might mean for a right account of property perception.
  4. A paper defending the thesis that perception-based justification for general beliefs about observable properties does not require acquaintance with those properties (or anything like acquaintance, for that matter).
In philosophy of law:
  1. A paper that outlines and motivates an approach to general jurisprudence that roughly parallels Strawson's 'descriptive metaphysics'
  2. A paper co-authored with my brother, Tashi Alford-Duguid, that develops and defends a new account of how control can help determine the scope of informational privacy
  3. A second paper co-authored with my brother, Tashi Alford-Duguid, on a connection between privacy, search, and algorithms.
In philosophy of language:
  1. A paper on Frege's puzzle, higher order quantification, and the explanatory role of reference
  2. A paper that traces a neglected aspect of linguistic presupposition's epistemic significance

Dissertation: Getting Properties in Mind